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NEW YORK CITY'S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM:
REVERSING THE CYCLE OF CORRUPTION AND REACTIONARY
REFORM
INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 1997, New York City entered into approximately $5.8
billion dollars worth of contracts.' The attendant problems of effectively
managing a system the size of New York City are further complicated by
the fact that the multiple goals of government contracting-efficiency,
prevention of corruption, and fairness to the providers of goods and
services-seem to be at odds with one another. 2 The government must be
as efficient as possible to maximize taxpayer dollars.' The government
must minimize the potential for corruption, and even the appearance of
corruption, to ensure that taxpayers do not lose trust in the system.4
Finally, the government must be fair to the potential providers of services
to ensure that a pool of qualified, responsible bidders remain available.
Attaining these goals requires a difficult balance. 6
Historically, New York City has not been up to the challenge. This
failure results, in large part, because a significant amount of contracting
reform in New York City occurred as a reaction to scandal.'
Consequently, multiple procedures have been adopted over the years to
combat corruption. Unfortunately, these procedures delay the procurement
process. 9

1. See Ross Sandier, Top 100 Contractsfor FY 1997 Equal 50 Percent of the Value
of All City Contracts, CITYLAW (Center for N.Y. City .aw, N.Y.L. Sch., New York,
N.Y.), Sept./Oct. 1997, at 97.
2. See Frank Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Purging Corruptionfrom Public
Contracting:The 'Solutions' Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 143,
146 (1995).
3. See id. at 173.
4. See id. at 146.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 173.
7. See generallyA Ship Without a Captain:The ContractingProcessin New York City,
in GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990s, at 461, 469-82 (Bruce A. Green ed.,
1990).
8. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 145-50.
9. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 477.
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The 1989 revision of the New York City Charter brought widespread
change to the process of procuring City contracts,' 0 guided largely by
reaction to scandal." However, the Charter Revision Commission's
creation of the Procurement Policy Board, with its stated goal of providing
continual improvement of the New York City procurement policy, has the
potential to break the vicious cycle of corruption, reactionary reform, and
inefficiency in procurement contracting.
Part I2 of this Note outlines the City's preferred method of
procurement (the competitive bidding process), describes how the
procedures adopted to prevent corruption undermine the underlying goals
of government contracting, and analyzes recent efforts to remedy some of
the long-standing problems. Part II 1' outlines the non-competitive bid
methods of procurement, describes how the reaction to corruption affected
the procurement reform of the 1989 New York City Charter Revision, and
analyzes subsequent efforts to remedy the long-standing problems. Part
II114 discusses section 326 of the New York City Charter and illustrates
how reaction to corruption caused the City to adopt an inefficient
procedure. Part IV 15 critiques this procedure, discusses recent reforms to
the procedure by the Procurement Policy Board, and offers suggestions for
further improvement.
I. AN OUTLINE OF COMPETITIVE SEALED BIDDING

Competitive sealed bidding is the City's preferred method of
procurement, because it is believed that competitive sealed bidding
provides the best price, while at the same time, prevents corruption and

10.

The City of New York Procurement Policy Board Rules defines "Procurement"

as:
Buying, purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise acquiring any goods, services,
or construction. It also includes all functions that pertain to the obtaining of any
good, service, or construction, including planning, description of requirements,
solicitation and selection of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all
phases of contract administration, including receipt and acceptance evaluation of
performance and final payment.
CITY OF NEW YORK PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD, CITY OF NEW YORK PROCUREMENT
POLICY BOARD RULES § 1-07 (1997) [hereinafter PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES].

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 148-49.
See infra notes 16-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 46-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-112 and accompanying text.
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ensures equal opportunities to those who submit bids.16 The competitive
sealed bidding system requires the agency seeking to procure goods or
services to notify the public of its specifications and invite bids.17 The bids
submitted are reviewed, and the contract is awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder.' 8 Despite the City's preference for this system, it is not
without its shortcomings.
Historically, the procedures New York City has adopted to combat
corruption have caused the contracting process to take much more time
than it does in the private sector.' 9 There are various procedures in place
to verify that a bidder is responsible. 20 Bidders must complete
questionnaires, and their names must be run through the "Vendex"
computer system, 2 1 which records data regarding any integrity-related
problems of contractors. 22 The city comptroller, who registers contracts,
can object to a contract if he or she believes "there is possible corruption
in the letting of the contract or that the proposed contractor is involved in
corrupt activity."'
The effect that these requirements have on minimizing corruption is
impossible to determine. 24 However, one verifiable effect is that many
qualified contractors do not bid on contracts with New York City because
of the increased time, paperwork, and attendant cost of the vendor
responsibility review process?25 In many instances, this causes a lack of
true competition. Some experts consider "five bids or three bids the bare

16. Competitive sealed bidding was adopted in New York City in the 1870s in reaction
to Tammany Hall corruption scandals. This foreshadowed the City's proclivity to reform
the contracting process in response to a major scandal.
In 1862, William Marcy Tweed gained control of the Board of Supervisors. Due to
.sweetheart deals," where contracts were steered to Tweed associates resulting in
overinflated bills, the New York County courthouse construction wound up taking a decade
to complete, costing taxpayers $8 million. The original budget was $250,000. The result
was reform and the push for a competitive system of procurement that limited officials'
discretion in the contracting process. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 145-46.
17.

See id. at 146.

18. See id.
19. See generally id.; A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 477.
20. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 5-02.
21.

See id.

22. See id.
23. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 328 (1989). The comptroller must deliver an
objection to the mayor, who must respond in writing. The mayor may require registration
of the contract if corrective action has been or will be taken, or if the mayor disagrees with
the comptroller's objection. See id.
24. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 169.
25.

See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 469.
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minimum necessary for adequate competition. ,26 Prior to the revision of
the Charter in 1989, New York City fell below this "bare minimum" all
too often. 27
Furthermore, this system often does not provide New York City with
the best price. The delay and oppressive processes discourage many
contractors from pursuing contracts with New York City. 28 As a result,
contractors know there will be little competition, and are therefore under
much less pressure to keep their bids low. 29 Due to the small number of
competitors, contractors quickly become aware of their competitors' price
structure.30 A competitive process so easily undermined does not keep
prices down.
The competitive sealed bidding system actually increases the potential
The absence of significant competition
for some forms of corruption."
12
makes bid rigging possible. When only a small group of the same firms
bid on certain types of contracts, it is easier for these firms to act
collusively.33 The system does not encourage the most qualified firms to
submit bids but instead encourages firms who have adapted to the system
and who have the knowledge to manipulate it. 34 These firms can easily
work together to exploit the system.
Another shortcoming of the system is that it does not promote fairness
to the provider of services. 35 The inordinate delays in the process and in
receiving payment for services provided is unfair to the contractors. This
unfairness is therefore reflected in the prices the City receives. 36 Despite
the problems with the competitive sealed bidding system, it is still the
preferred method of procurement in New York City.37 When the New
York City Charter was revised in 1989, the competitive sealed bidding
system remained basically unchanged, while the non-competitive bid

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 469.
See id. at 469-72.
See id. at 473-74.
See id. at 475.

30.

See id.

31.

See id. at 481.

32.

See id.

33. See id.
34.

See id.

35. See id. at 473-74.
36. See id. at 473-75.
37. See Eric Lane, The Sorrows of Seabury or How Not to Read a Statute, CITYLAW
(Center for N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1995, at 77; Edward N.
Costikyan & Leslie U. Cornfeld, NYC's New ProcurementStncture: Birth of an Imperial
Agency, 204 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (1990).
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methods of procurement-the focus of the most recent corruption scandals
in New York-were revised dramatically. 38
However, the New York City Charter Revision Commission, in
creating the Procurement Policy Board, established the potential for
continuous improvement in City procurement policy making. The Board's
continuous focus on procurement may help break the cycle of reactionary
policy making. For example, in an attempt to remedy the problem of late
payments to vendors, the Procurement Policy Board, pursuant to New York
City Charter section 332, promulgated PPB rule 6-07 which provided for
strict procedures for prompt payment of vendors. 39 As a result, in fiscal
year 1995, New York City paid 58% of invoices on time, and 30% were
paid during the grace period."n In fiscal year 1996, 60% were paid on
time, and 27% were paid during the grace period. 4 Section 332 of the
City Charter also directs the Procurement Policy Board to report annually
on prompt payment efforts.42
This type of effort has the potential to improve the system. If vendors
are confident that they will be paid promptly, they will be more likely to
bid on work with the City.4 3 This effort seems to be working. Because
many city agencies did not keep adequate records prior to the charter
revision," a detailed comparison of the levels of competition for contracts
before and after the 1989 charter revision is not possible; however, the
levels seem to have increased substantially in recent years. 45

38. See Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 1.
39. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 6-07; see also N.Y.
CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 332 (1989); City Contracts:PromptPayment, CITYLAW (Center
for N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1995, at 80.
40. See City Slashes 1996 Interest Payments:DOT Still Top Payer, CITYLAW (Center
for N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Aug./Sept. 1996, at 86.
41. See id.
42. See City Contracts: Prompt Payment, supra note 39, at 80.
43. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 473.
44. It should be noted that the Procurement Policy Board has remedied this inadequate
record keeping by requiring that the contracting agency report the number of responses from
vendors for each contract to be registered. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES,
supra note 10, § 5-07(e)(vii).
45. Compare STATISTICAL SUMMARY SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPTROLLER'S
COMPREHENSIVEANNUALCONTRACTSREPORT FORFISCALYEARENDINGJUNE 1996, 17-18
(1997) [hereinafter STATISTICALSUMMARY SUPPLEMENT] (providing statistics for the years
1993 to 1996 that indicate a range of 77% to 87% of City contracts awarded through
competitive systems that received three or more responses), with A Ship Without a Captain,
supra note 7, at 469-72 (describing the lack of competition for contracts with New York
City prior to the revision of the Charter in 1989).
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II. AN OUTLINE OF NON-COMPETITIVE BID PROCUREMENT

In certain situations, delineated by the New York City Charter, the
competitive system of procurement can be circumvented. The noncompetitive methods are exceptions to the preferred competitive system in
instances where it is perceived that the competitive system would not be
feasible or cause a substantial benefit. 46 As with the competitive bidding
process, scandal prompted reform of the non-competitive bid methods of
contracting.47
For example, in 1986 the Parking Violations Bureau scandals made
headlines. 48 The Parking Violations Bureau ("PVB") awarded contracts to
companies with connections to PVB officials, then-Queens Borough
President Donald Manes and Bronx Democratic leader Stanley Friedman,
by using a "sole source" contracting method of procurement, a noncompetitive method used when there is only one acceptable supplier for the
goods or services sought.4 9 Even when competitive bids were sought for
a computer contract, behind the scenes, shareholders of Friedman's shell
company, Citisource, helped write the contract specifications to give
Friedman's firm an "enormous advantage. 50 When this was revealed, the
deficiencies of the non-competitive system of procurement were
spotlighted. The Charter Revision Commission's procurement provisions
were guided largely in response to the PVB scandal.'
Prior to the revision of the New York City Charter in 1989, an agency
that awarded a contract over $10,000-$15,000 for construction contracts
that were not the product of competitive bidding was required to get the
contract approved by the Board of Estimate. 52 This occurred at public
meetings, 3 but the Board of Estimate's semi-monthly meetings contained
hundreds of items on the agenda.54 Furthermore, there was little time

46. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 312 (1989); see also Anechiarico & Jacobs,
supra note 2, at 149. This Note does not address the extent to which the current
procurement provisions may conflict with state law requirements for the use of competitive
sealed bids. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103 (McKinney 1986).
47. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 148-49.
48. See id. at 147-48.
49. See id. Sole source contracting is still used. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD
RULES, supra note 10, § 3-05.

50. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 148-49.
51. See id. at 149.
52. See Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 1.
53.

See N.Y.

STATE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, THE APPROVAL PROCESS FOR

NON-COMPETITIVE CONTRACTS IN NEW YORK CITY, REP. A-2-87, at

54. See id.

6 (1986).
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between the calendaring of a contract and the hearing,55 and the members
of the Board of Estimate-the mayor, who served as chairman, the City
comptroller, the president of the City Council, and the presidents of each
of the five boroughs-often sent representatives in their place to attend
these meetings. 5 6 Finally, the Board of Estimate's involvement usually
occurred too late in the process. For the Board to decide not to approve
a contract, it would have needed to disregard the administration's
expectation of approval as well as the fact that funds were already
expended in preparation for the contract. 8
The volume of contracts under consideration, the time constraints, and
the numerous responsibilities of the members of the Board, made serious
review of contracts impossible.S Board of Estimate approval became a
mere rubber stamp.6
In its Final Report, the Charter Revision
Commission stated that the Board of Estimate's approval process had very
little impact on City policy, because it occurred at the end of the process
and did not promote integrity as accountability. Accountability was
disbursed to all eight members of the Board. 6' The 1989 New York
Charter Revision Commission was ultimately charged with improving this
system.
Around the time of the PVB scandals, residents of Brooklyn
challenged the voting structure of the Board of Estimate.62 The resultant
decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, in Board of Estimate v. Morris,
held that the voting structure violated the "one person-one vote" standard.
The borough presidents each had a single vote even though each
represented boroughs of different populations.63
Rather than reshuffling the relative voting power of the members of the
Board, the Charter Revision Commission decided to eliminate the Board of
Estimate altogether. 4 This decision had widespread ramifications. For
example, there was the need to rework the non-competitive bid contract
approval process.

55. See id. at 7.
56. See id. at 6.
57.

See Lane, supra note 37, at 76.

58. See id.
59. See N.Y.
60.

STATE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER,

supra note 53,

at

7.

See Lane, supra note 37, at 76.
61. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, JAN. 1989-Nov. 1989, at 10 (1990) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT]; see also Lane, supra note 37, at 76.
62. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989).
63. See id. at 700-02.
64. See John Horenstein & Stanley Trybulski, New York City's CharterRevision: The
PoliticalAftermath, 1 J.L. &POL'Y 113, 133 (1993).
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The 1989 Charter Revisions ("new Charter") attempted to limit the use
of non-competitive means of procurement. 65 However, like the old

Charter, several exceptions to the competitive bid system were put in

place. 6 Specifically, small purchases, 67 emergency procurements,68
intergovernmental procurements, 69 and special case exceptions 7 were
exempted from competitive sealed bidding. The new Charter attempts to
foster the most competitive method of procurement whenever possible.7'
Competitive sealed bidding remains the preferred method of procurement.'
Under the new Charter, a procuring agency using special case exceptions
to competitive sealed bidding must choose the next most competitive
method under the circumstances, such as competitive sealed bids from prequalified vendors,74 competitive sealed proposals,7' or competitive sealed
proposals from pre-qualified vendors.76 The new Charter also attempts to
foster accountability for avoiding competitive sealed bidding by delineating
the particular circumstances authorizing an agency to invoke the special
case exception. 7
Critics of the new Charter believe that, in attempting to limit a
procuring agency's opportunity to avoid the competitive sealed bidding
7
process, the drafters may have actually made it easier for them to avoid it. 1
To that effect, it has been noted that the exceptions are broadly defined and

65. See Lane, supra note 37, at 77.
66. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 (1989).
67. See id. § 314.

68.

See id. § 325.

69. See id. § 316.
70. See id. § 312.

71. Under the old Charter, special case determinations were reviewed by the Board
of Estimate, but now this decision is left to the agency's discretion. See Costikyan &
Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 1.
72. See Lane, supra note 37, at 77.
73. See Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 2.
74.

Competitive sealed bids from pre-qualified vendors differs from competitive sealed

bidding in that the agency only solicits bids from a pre-determined list of providers of goods
and services. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 318 (1989).
75. Competitive sealed proposals differ from competitive sealed bidding in that the
provider of the good or service sought must submit a "detailed statement of the manner in
which the proposer intends to perform" if awarded the contract. See PROCUREMENT POLICY
BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 3-03; see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 319 (1989).
76. Competitive sealed proposals from pre-qualified vendors allow the procuring
agency to accept proposals from a pre-determined list of providers of goods and services.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 320 (1989); see also Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note
37, at 7.
77. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 312 (1989); see also Costikyan & Cornfeld,
supra note 37, at 6.
78. See Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 6.
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may be abused by the agencies.7 9 This criticism appears well-founded. In
fiscal year 1996, only 41 % of all contracts were awarded via competitive
sealed bids 8°-the lowest percentage reached in five years.8 '
The procurement process's competing objectives of increasing
efficiency and minimizing opportunity for corruption must be balanced
when deciding how much discretion to grant City agencies in the area of
procurement. Increasing decision-making discretion in the agencies
themselves should speed up the contracting process.8 2 However, agencies
have historically abused this discretion. 83 To this end, there is no easy
solution, as even seemingly straightforward rules are undermined. 4
For example, procurement audits conducted by the comptroller's office
in fiscal year 1996 uncovered abuse of the small purchase exception to
competitive bidding. The Department of Corrections had artificially
limited the dollar amount of purchases to remain within the small purchase
threshold and thereby circumvented the competitive bidding process.85 This
artificial limitation is not necessarily proof of corruption in the sense of
stealing government funds; rather, it may simply be a manifestation of the
agency personnel's frustration with the competitive bidding system.
Regardless of the reasons behind these actions, it demonstrates the relative
ease with which the competitive bidding process can be circumvented.
III. SECTION 326
Though the Commission found that the old procedure lacked benefit,
a similar procedure was enacted in the revised Charter.86 Section 326 of
the New York City Charter is an example of a procedure adopted to
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in the "post Board of

79. See id. (commenting on the "New Charter's" broad special-case exception
definitions).
80. See STATISTICAL SUMMARY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 45, at ii.
81. See id.
82. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 477-79.
83. See supra notes 16-18, 48-52 and accompanying text.
84. Despite the problems with granting broad discretion to City contracting officials,
the Procurement Policy Board is attempting to grant further discretion. For example, the
dollar amount of the small purchase limits has been raised in most cases to $25,000 for
goods and services and $50,000 for construction contracts, up from $10,000 and $15,000
respectively. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 3-08; see also
PurchasesLess than $2,500 Freedfrom Competition Requirements, CITYLAW (Center for
N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1995, at 111.
85. See ALAN G. HEVESI, REPORT TO THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL ON CITY
COMPTROLLER AUDIT OPERATIONS FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 6 (1997).

86. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 61, at 10.
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Estimate" non-competitive bid procurement process. Section 326 provides
that a procuring agency must hold a public hearing for all contracts over
$100,000 that are awarded by means other than competitive sealed bids or
competitive sealed bids from prequalified vendors."
The Revision Commission, in evaluating the public hearings process,
was aware of the low likelihood of public involvement. Besides its
acknowledgment that the old Board of Estimate process was not
beneficial, 8s the Commission's discussion regarding the possibility of
having the procuring agency hold a hearing substantiates the belief that a
change in format would not increase the benefits. For example, thenDirector of Contracts Joel Copperman stated the following:
[I]f you have public hearings on such contracts, I would suggest
to you that no one would come. The public process, what goes on
in the Board of Estimate is public in that there are a number of
elected officials involved, but it doesn't involve the general public
89

True to the predictions, section 326 public hearings have had a lack of
public involvement. The Department of Environmental Protection held
twenty-six public hearings on non-competitive bid contracts in fiscal year
1996.90 The total dollar amount of contracts awarded was $60,385,000. 91
No testimony was heard at any of the twenty-six public hearings.'
Similarly, the Department of Transportation held hearings on fifty-six
contracts pursuant to section 326 in fiscal year 1997. 3 The total dollar
amount of these contracts was $165,700,000.' Testimony was received at

87. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 326 (1989). The Procurement Policy Board
rules also exempt emergency contracts, contracts made on an accelerated basis due to price
fluctuations in the markets, and contracts for which a hearing would disclose litigation
strategy. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 5-06 (delineating
public hearing requirements).
88. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 61, at 10.
89. Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989 (statement of Joel Copperman).
90. See Letter from Debra Butlien, Professional Services Contract Liaison, City of
New York Department of Environmental Protection, to Joseph A. Cosentino 1 (Nov. 7,
1997) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
91. See id.

92. See Letter from Paul Stanton, Agency Chief Contracting Officer, New York City
Department of Transportation, to Joseph Cosentino 1 (Dec. 1997) (on file with the New
York Law School Law Review).
93. See id.
94. See id.
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95 but this testimony produced
nine of the hearings,
no changes to the
96

contracts at issue.

Neither the Department of Environmental Protection nor the
Department of Transportation keep records of the cost of holding section
326 hearings, but time is likely wasted and costs are certainly incurred.97
Each hearing must be advertised in the City Record at least ten days prior
to the hearing. 98 The agency head or deputy must be present for the
hearing. 9 9 At a hearing, a script is read, no one usually testifies, and
subsequently the hearing is closed. Section 326 was an attempt to avoid the
appearance of corruption. In reality time and money are sacrificed without
apparent benefit.
IV. IMPROVING SECTION

326

Normally, no one from the public comes to the scheduled hearings on
procurement contracts. Therefore, these hearings produce no foreseeable
benefit that would not be achieved by simply requesting written
submissions from the public. Furthermore, the current Procurement Policy
Board Rules do not allow an agency representative at a hearing to make any
commitments to change a proposed contract.'I° The testimony is made for
the record and the agency representative may ask questions of the witness.
The agency is not bound by the public commentary but must take it into
consideration. 0 1 A summary of the testimony and the agency's response
must be kept 0in2 the contract file. The summary and contract file are public
information. 1
A better result that still includes the potential for public participation
could be achieved through the agency's acceptance of written
correspondence from the public. 0 3 Public hearings, at their best, provide
a forum for public participation, but often, little value is added to the

95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Public Hearing Not Required For ContractRenewals, CITYLAW (Center for
N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1995, at 37.
98. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 5-06.

99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. (explaining testimony must be "considered" and that a written response
from agency must set out how, if at all, the testimony affected the contract).
102. See id.
103. It should be noted that a referendum is required to do away with a Charter
provision "requiring a public notice and hearing as a condition precedent to official action."
N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 38 (1989).
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process.'°4 An issue that brings the public out is normally an emotional
affair. The acceptance of written submissions from the public would still
allow for participation in the process and could serve to spur more
thoughtful input. 'I
The opportunity for the public to submit ideas in writing may spur
additional participation. Currently, hearings are held at City Hall at 10:00
a.m. on weekdays. Working individuals wishing to supply information on
a particular contract or contractor would have to take time from their work
day to participate. This inconvenience likely contributes to the lack of
participation.
If the opportunity for the public to speak, as opposed to write, remains
in the non-competitive bid procurement process, some assurance should be
made that the public will participate before a hearing is held. The public
notice requirements could remain, but interested parties would have to
acknowledge their desire to speak in advance of the hearings in lieu of
submitting written commentary. As a result, fewer hearings would be
held. However, the hearings will have guaranteed public involvement and
pertinent testimony. If this method were utilized in fiscal year 1997, the
Department of Environmental Protection and Department of Transportation
would have saved the time and expense of holding hearings which produced
no testimony on the combined seventy-three contracts.
The expansion of the public hearings requirement is not without its
proponents. The New York State Commission on Government Integrity
recommended consideration of public hearings "whenever public benefits
or expenditures of a significant magnitude are being considered."' 6
However, utilization of these requirements must add value to the process.
This value is not evident with the section 326 hearings. What is
particularly disingenuous about section 326 is that it has incorporated all
that was ineffective about the old Board of Estimate procedure while
eliminating the one feature that was arguably effective: the oversight
provision. The hearings still take place at the end of the process and still
foster very little public participation, but do not provide for any oversight
outside of the contracting agency. " Thus, the Commission that denounced
the Board of Estimate review process as ineffective has adopted a
procedure that is even less effective.'0 8
The important aspect of the public hearing is the opportunity for public
participation. When the public does not wish to participate, conducting a
104. See, e.g., PHIL K. HOWARD, THE DEATH

OF COMMON SENSE 92-93 (1994).
105. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989 (statement of Lilliam Barrios-Paoli).
106. A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 338.
107. By the time a public hearing is held, the terms and contractor have been
negotiated. See PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 5-06.
108. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 61, at 10.
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hearing spurred by fear of the appearance of corruption wastes the
resources of the city residents. The argument can be made, however, that
the threat of being exposed at a public hearing may be enough to prevent
corruption. "°Under the new Charter, as under the old, most contracts must
be registered by the comptroller. 1 0 The comptroller may object to the
contract on the basis of perceived corruption either on the part of the
contractor or the procurement process."1 With this measure already in
place, it does not seem likely that hearings with no public attendance serve
to prevent corruption. Instead, they prevent efficiency.
The Procurement Policy Board has recognized the inefficiency of
holding a public hearing where a contract is simply being renewed. The
Board subsequently changed the rule, and mandatory hearings are no longer
"required when an agency exercises a renewal option where the original
112
contract or prior renewal was subject to a public hearing.
V. CONCLUSION

In examining the efficiency of government agencies, the multiple
objectives sought must be factored into the equation. As one commentator
noted, "when we complain that contracts were awarded without competitive
bidding or in a way that allowed bureaucrats to line their pockets we
acknowledge that we care about many things.., we care about contextual
goals .... 113 Certain benefits, such as corruption prevention, are not
easily determinable." 4 It is impossible to determine how much corruption
would have taken place absent a certain procedure." 5 However,
superfluous and ineffective procedures must be revised." 6 Before the
system of ineffective procedures is brought to light by a headline-making
scandal, the Procurement Policy Board has the potential for thoughtful
revision and elimination of ineffective procedures.
Commentators have suggested that small adjustments to the contracting
process have contributed to the problem and that New York City's system
is too big to be adjusted on a small scale." 7 However, this critique focuses

109.
110.
111.

See Costikyan & Cornfeld, supra note 37, at 1.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 328 (1989).
See id.

112. Public Hearing Not Required for Contract Renewals, supra note 97, at 37; see
also PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD RULES, supra note 10, § 5-06.
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114. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 169.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 144.
117. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 7, at 462.
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on the addition of procedures which serve to paralyze the system over time.
Constant analysis and streamlining is essential." 8 Every procedure must
be questioned to determine what value is added to the process."' In this
way, the system is improved through thoughtful changes and not
reactionary damage control.
The Procurement Policy Board has successfully streamlined the process
and "reduced the procurement rules by half. ,120 However, whether the
Board is truly committed to continue this positive trend will not be tested
until the next headline-making contracting scandal hits New York City.
Joseph A. Cosentino, Jr.

118. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 144.
119. See id.
120. Gene Russianoff, CharterRevision Revs Up, CITYLAW (Center for N.Y. City
Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Jan./Feb. 1998, at 4.

